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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-1883
___________
DARREN KEYS,
                                                             Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; 
RON SENIFF; PATRICK L. MEEHAN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-04050)
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 5, 2008
Before:     MCKEE, RENDELL AND SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:  July 11, 2008 )
_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Darren Keys, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s
dismissal of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  We exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the grant of a motion to dismiss de
novo, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences
in favor of the plaintiff.  In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir.
2004).
In September 2007, Keys filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of
Justice (“DOJ”), Ron Seniff, a correctional officer at Allenwood Prison Camp, where
Keys was residing, and Patrick Meehan, the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, alleging that Defendants prevented him from pursuing a
personal injury claim arising from an accident that occurred while Keys was a passenger
in a car driven by Seniff.  Keys contends that Defendants failed to adjudicate his “Tort
Claim” for injuries resulting from the accident against the driver of the vehicle that hit the
car and that this failure denied him “due process of law, access to the courts” and
constituted violations of various felony criminal statutes.  
The District Court granted Defendants’ unopposed motion to dismiss on March 13,
2008, because the complaint sought monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from suit and because it was barred by the statute of limitations.  Keys filed an appeal
without explaining why he did not oppose the motion and without asking for
reconsideration.  In response, the District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion on April
24, 2008, explaining the rationale for dismissing the action.
For substantially the reasons explained by the District Court, Keys’ complaint was
properly dismissed.  As the District Court explained, Keys cannot maintain a Bivens
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), the1
Supreme Court implied a cause of action for damages against federal agents who
allegedly violated the Constitution.  
Keys filed a “Tort Claim” for damages with the Bureau of Prisons.  He received a2
letter dated September 23, 1999, acknowledging receipt of the claim and stating that the
claim would be reviewed and adjudicated within six months from the September date. 
Six months later, on March 16, 2000, Keys inquired of the status of the claim but his
inquiry was never answered.  Thus, by March of 2000, or at least a few weeks later, Keys
knew or should have known of his alleged injury, that Defendants had failed to adjudicate
his claim.  
action against the United States Department of Justice, a federal agency.  See FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1994).  1
Additionally, Keys’ constitutional claims under Bivens against any individuals are
barred because they are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions.  See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985) (applying state
statute of limitations in § 1983 action); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed.
Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1088 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988); 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 5524 (personal injuries in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of
limitations).  The automobile accident took place in August 1999, and Keys
acknowledges that he knew or had reason to know of his injuries by at least September
23, 1999.  (See Compl. ¶ 18.)  The alleged failure of Defendant to prosecute his personal
injury claim was known to him no later than April or May 2000, (see Compl. ¶ 19), over
seven years before this action was filed.   See Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d2
899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991) (statute of limitations begins to run when plaintiff knew or had
reason to know of the injuries for which he sought relief).  Therefore, the District Court
Review of the denial of leave to amend is for abuse of discretion.  Hill v. City of3
Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 134 (3d Cir. 2005).
Keys asserts that he never received an answer after filing a tort claim with the4
Bureau of Prisons; however, the agency’s lack of response does not excuse his failure to
file within the limitations period.  A plaintiff asserting a claim pursuant to the FTCA must
present his claim to the relevant government agency and await either a final
administrative disposition or the passage of six months without such a disposition.  28
U.S.C. § 2675(a).
properly dismissed the complaint without granting leave to amend.  See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (the
district court need not allow amendment of an in forma pauperis complaint where
“amendment would be inequitable or futile”).    
In addition, we agree that allowing Keys leave to amend to add the United States
as a defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) would have been futile
because the statute of limitations has expired.   Under the FTCA, a claim against the3
United States is barred unless it is presented to the appropriate federal agency within two
years of the events giving rise to the claims or “unless action is begun within six months
after the . . . notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.” 
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).  Keys did not file his complaint until six years after the limitations
had passed, nor does he present any justification for the equitable tolling of his claim.  4
Therefore the District Court did not err in finding that granting leave to amend would
have been futile.  See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108.
Because no action may lie against the DOJ and the claims against the remaining
Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations, the District Court properly dismissed
the complaint.  We will therefore dismiss the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
